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ABSTRACT 
 
 
According to Terror Management Theory, when mortality is made salient the potential to 
experience terror causes powerful worldview defenses to manifest to suppress this potential. 
Recently, however, the theory has been criticized because no actual evidence has been found to 
show this potential to experience terror. The current research used Galvanic Skin Response and a 
battery of self-report measures (e.g. negative affect, stress, fear, distress, etc.) to attempt to 
provide evidence of potential terror. The results were partially confirmatory suggesting that 
although mortality salience failed to evoke arousal, negative affect, and stress, it did evoke 
sadness and distress and suggests that terror is a highly complex combination of multiple 
negative components as well as physiological arousal. Interpretations and explanations of these 
results are discussed in accordance with previous Terror Management research.  
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CHAPTER I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 In everyday life, people are surrounded by reminders of death and dying. Consider the 
local news reporting on a wreck that killed several people or horror movies displaying often 
graphic depictions of death. Additionally, there are a vast number of cemeteries throughout the 
world that serve as very literal reminders of our finite existence. These constant reminders of 
death should cause us as humans to experience a significant amount of anxiety, thus causing us 
to avoid them (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). We should deplore watching the 
news, avoid horror movies, and even drive quickly past even the smallest roadside cemetery or 
memorial because they remind us of our ultimate end. Interestingly, we often enjoy these 
reminders of death, however. The news still broadcasts several times daily, new horror movies 
are filmed and presented several times each year, and many of the larger cemeteries have become 
national parks with millions of visitors each year. Research into Terror Management Theory 
(TMT) attempts to explain this phenomenon, suggesting that we hold several ego defensive 
mechanisms that allow us to transcend death and achieve a degree of immortality (Greenberg et 
al., 1990; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). According to TMT, these defense 
mechanisms allow us to avoid the anxiety associated with death and actually enjoy the many 
themes of death present in everyday life. 
 Research into TMT is largely based on the philosophical works of cultural anthropologist 
Ernest Becker (1962; 1973; 1975) in which he argues that humans are capable of thinking in a 
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self-reflective, temporal, and symbolic manner. Subsequent research suggests that this ability can 
be quite beneficial to optimistic experience (Gilbert, 2007), but it also allows us to conceptualize 
more negative experiences. For instance, we can contemplate our purpose in life (or lack 
thereof), or even a world in which we do not exist. We can even think about our own death and a 
variety of ways in which that may occur. This conceptualization is exacerbated by the realization 
that the world is an uncontrollable place in which our death could occur at any moment and 
without any foreseeable reason in many cases. Further, Becker (1973) suggests that this 
realization should be so anxiety provoking that we should be immobilized with fear. Culture, 
however, provides a way to instill the world with order and permanence, thus allowing us to 
achieve a degree of immortality by being part of something larger than ourselves (Greenberg et 
al., 1986) and to transcend death and the uncertainty involved. 
 
The Need for Self-Esteem 
 In order to successfully defend against death anxiety, TMT posits that it is imperative to 
boost self-esteem (Greenberg et al., 1986). This self-esteem boost comes from the human desire 
to view the world as a just place in which people who do good are rewarded and those that do 
bad are punished (Lerner, 1965). The development of this need for self-esteem and the just-world 
conception comes largely from our early life experiences with our parents. As children, we are 
quick to view the world as orderly and predictable due to our parents’ reactions to our behavior 
and actions. As children gain more cognitive capabilities, they are able to recognize the 
conditional love given to them by their parents. Well-behaved children are rewarded with love 
and affection from their parents. These rewards are associated with an increase in self-esteem 
due to the positive feelings that they evoke. Misbehaved children, however, are given some form 
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of punishment (e.g. spankings, withdrawal of love, time-outs). Alternatively, these punishments 
are associated with a decrease in self-esteem due to the negative feelings associated with them. 
As children age, they are able to predict the outcome of their actions and determine the response 
given to them by their parents before the action is even committed, causing them to view the 
world as just and predictable. Children must believe that they are good so that they do not have 
to worry about a punishment and the negative feelings associated with it (Greenberg et al., 1986). 
Thus, TMT suggests that good and bad children get what they deserve based on their actions and 
these responses cause the differences in self-esteem associated with them.  
 With this increasing cognitive ability, however, children are eventually able to realize 
that there are forces that supersede their parents. Additionally, they can grasp the concept of 
mortality. With this realization, children are not only able to understand that they are mortal, but 
also that their parents are mortal and will not always be able to protect them, causing them to 
lose the primary mechanism to promote self-esteem. In order to maintain the belief in a just 
world of order and permanence, the importance of parents in maintaining self-value is replaced 
by culture and the tenets important to each culture (nationalism, religion, relationships, etc.). Just 
as the parents did during early childhood, culture has certain rules, customs, and traditions that 
allow us to attain self-value by upholding those tenets important to that culture. By following 
these rules, customs, and traditions, we are able to boost our self-esteem because we do not have 
to worry about a punishment that would come from violating these values, whereas that someone 
who deviates from these tenets should be punished before a follower (Greenberg et al., 1986). 
 This need for self-esteem is not a novel argument within TMT. Much research leading 
into the development of TMT provided empirical evidence for human’s innate desire to boost 
self-esteem in order to feel accomplished. Research into self-handicapping (Berglas and Jones, 
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1978) argued for a human desire to externally threaten their own chances of successfully 
completing a task if we anticipate the possibility of failing the task. Although initially 
perplexing, this suggests that humans are motivated to protect their self-esteem by seeking out 
external justifications for their inability to complete a task that could possibly end with failure. 
Additionally, one simply needs to closely examine cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) 
in which people who have cognitions that are juxtaposed with one another will experience a state 
of cognitive dissonance. According to cognitive dissonance theory, this state is so unpleasant that 
it forces the person to alter one of the two juxtaposed cognitions in order to make them 
harmonious with one another, even when changing the cognition alters the meaning, context, etc. 
within that cognition. One such interpretation of this phenomenon consistent with TMT argues 
that the purpose of this attitude change is to shield the person from having to admit that they 
believe or have done something that was considered negatively by others or society (Greenberg 
et al., 1986). This ultimately allows humans to shield themselves from threats to self-esteem.  
 This need for self-esteem is not contained to public displays of accomplishment, 
however. Although the previous examples do suggest a need for public recognition and self-
esteem maintenance, other research suggests that personal self-esteem maintenance becomes 
paramount when one’s public image is vulnerable (Greenberg et al., 1986). Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, & Paisley (1984) provide evidence for this private self-esteem maintenance by 
demonstrating self-esteem maintenance strategies (i.e. test anxiety) even under anonymous 
testing conditions. Additionally, this effect was removed when a strong incentive was given to 
perform well, suggesting that private self-esteem maintenance was important in the absence of 
external incentives. To add further support to this phenomenon, subsequent research suggests 
that following a public failure, people boost their personal self-image privately in order to 
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compensate for the public failure (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). Concerning other people’s 
judgment however, Tesser and Paulhus (1983) argue that people who know that they publicly 
perform well, but believe that other people evaluate their performance poorly, reduced their 
private belief that the dimension was relevant. 
 From a TMT perspective and the aforementioned evidence integral to the founding of 
TMT, the importance of self-value and a just world are paramount to death transcendence. By 
following the rules, values, and customs important to our culture, we do not have to worry about 
death because we are boosting our self-esteem. We are publically performing in a way that does 
not allow for self-esteem to be threatened, thus playing an important role within the culture and 
ultimately boosting self-worth. A just world that upholds order would not allow someone to die 
that is upholding these values, allowing us to avoid the anxiety and terror associated with death 
awareness. Just as children must believe that they are good to avoid the worry of a punishment 
from their parents, we must believe that we are good to avoid the ultimate punishment (death) 
from the world (Greenberg et al., 1986). Within this link, harming self-esteem would allow for 
the anxiety and terror of the ultimate punishment to manifest, therefore we greatly 
overcompensate failures with private inflation of self-esteem (Greenberg and Psyzczynski, 
1985). Without this influx, we face the reality of confronting our finite existence. 
Interestingly, the aforementioned assumption in children has never been empirically 
examined from a TMT framework. Becker (1962; 1973) and Sullivan (1953) argue that feelings 
of security and safety are associated with increasing self-worth and that feelings of dread and 
terror are associated with decreased self-worth. Additionally Rochlin (1965) argues that as 
children age they change from a fear of abandonment by their parents to a fear of being 
perceived as useless. It is primarily from these works that the developmental portion of TMT was 
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derived, suggesting that this may be a simplistic or erroneous (especially when considering the 
age of these arguments) understanding of self-esteem and meaning making in children that leads 
to the development of defense mechanisms. Although the origins are suspect to error and require 
further empirical research, other research does provide support for the primary tenets of TMT 
that humans can use culture to provide a sense of personal meaning to boost self-esteem. 
 
Psychodynamic Assumptions 
 Many of the psychological assumptions integral to TMT come from classical 
psychoanalytic theory. Through the work of Rank, Becker was directly influenced by the works 
of Freud (Becker, 1973; Martin & van den Bos, 2014). Possibly the largest influence into TMT 
was that of the unconscious. Freud (1900/1953) explicitly argues that “the unconscious is the 
true physical self” (p. 557). Further, he suggests that the unconscious can influence observable 
behavior (Freud, 1914) in order to achieve personal gratification (Freud, 1924/1961). Although 
many of the early interpretations of this unconscious mind were primarily associated with 
repressed memories, this is a simplistic understanding of psychodynamic theory. Although 
psychodynamic theory posits that the unconscious mind does hold repressed memories, it also 
holds the mechanisms responsible for the Id and the Ego (Freud, 1923/1961). Primarily, the Id 
operates solely to bring pleasure to the person, functioning under the “pleasure principle,” and 
the Ego attempts to control the influence of the Id by exerting pressures from the external word 
via the “reality principle” (p. 25). According to Freudian psychodynamic theory, this 
unconscious struggle between the Id and Ego can interact with external forces to influence 
observable behavior (For a thorough explanation of one interpretation of the unconscious see 
Sletvold, 2013). 
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 Certainly, much of psychology has moved passed this classical psychodynamic theory 
due to more recent research; however, other research has suggested some credibility in certain 
areas Freud’s theory. Primarily, Wilson (2002) suggests that an adaptive, unconscious mind is 
integral to survival. Further, according to the lens model, unconscious processes are capable of 
influencing behaviors and decisions whereby decisions are made through a complex interplay 
between internal mechanisms and the environment (Brunswik, 1952; Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). 
Although the lens model suggests that environmental influences are primarily responsible for 
judgments, these influences need not be observed consciously; unconscious perceptions have the 
potential to influence judgments. This suggests that environmental influences can affect our 
behavior even when we are not aware of this influence (Newell & Shanks, 2014). Further, a 
meta-analysis by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) found that linear models can successfully predict 
judgments providing further validation for the lens model. These results together do suggest that 
the unconscious can influence behavior by illustrating the interplay between conscious 
awareness and unconscious motivations in decision-making. 
Although the degree to which the unconscious can influence cognition is quite 
controversial (Newell & Shanks, 2014), it is quite apparent that factors outside of conscious 
awareness can influence cognition and behavior (i.e. the lens model). It is from this assumption 
that much of TMT is drawn in that worldview defense mechanisms used to shield against death 
awareness, provide meaning, and boost self-esteem operate outside of conscious awareness in 
order to attain self-meaning in response to existential terror (Greenberg et al., 1986). More 
recently, TMT has been modified to suggest that these worldview defenses are not actually 
defending against actual terror, but unconscious terror (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 
1999). Thus, in accordance with psychodynamic theory, this unconscious struggle with 
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existential terror causes the manifestation of worldview defenses. One final modification (and 
the current TMT) suggests that neither conscious nor unconscious terror manifest, but the 
potential to experience existential anxiety is what causes the worldview defense manifestation 
(Greenberg et al., 2003). Thus this potential to experience unconscious anxiety causes the 
manifestation of worldview defenses to keep anxiety from manifesting by boosting self-esteem. 
 
Worldview Defensive Mechanisms  
 In order to shield against death anxiety, culture provides several defense mechanisms that 
allow us to boost our self-esteem and self-value. These mechanisms allow us to achieve a degree 
of symbolic or literal immortality by boosting our self-esteem, ultimately shielding against death 
anxiety (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). We use the same 
cognitive mechanisms used to incite feelings of terror in order to suppress these feelings. 
Although the specific cognitive mechanisms are never defined by TMT, TMT argues that they 
are a byproduct of human evolution. Specifically, within our evolutionary history, increasing 
cognitive capabilities eventually allowed us to contemplate events that had not happened yet (i.e. 
death). An extreme interpretation of TMT argues that culture and the values inherent in each 
culture were created for the sole purpose of shielding against death anxiety. We are able to deny 
our creatureliness and achieve a degree of immortality by living up to the expectations and 
values important to our culture. When we contemplate or are made aware of death, we are, thus, 
able to remember times that we adhered to the values important to our culture in order to boost 
our self-esteem, giving us a defense against death anxiety. This suggests that the culture one 
belongs to is primarily responsible for the defense mechanisms necessary to defend against the 
terror of nonexistence (Greenberg et al., 1986). 
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Subsequent research into TMT has revealed that these defense mechanisms are successful 
at mitigating the anxiety associated with mortality salience (see Arrowood & Pope, 2015 for a 
review) because of their ability to promote self-esteem. In a typical TMT laboratory paradigm, 
participants are asked to vividly write about their deaths and the inherent emotions within this 
cognition (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus., 1994). Following this 
manipulation, participants are given a short delay. This delay is necessary because TMT suggests 
that participants initially attempt to actively repress death awareness, but due to the cognitively 
taxing nature of repression, worldview defenses manifest as a more feasible shield against 
potential anxiety. This process of delayed worldview defense is known as the duel process of 
model of terror management (Pyszcyznski et al. 1999). Following this delay, worldview defenses 
are analyzed by having participants rate the credibility of two essays written by someone from an 
out-group. One essay is very favorable of the specific worldview and the other criticizes it. For 
instance, participants have been told that two immigrants wrote the two essays; one promoted the 
United States and the other criticized it. These essays are primarily used to examine a 
nationalism worldview defense and defense of one’s culture. Following the essays, participants 
are asked to rate the credibility of the essays and the authors as well as overall liking (Greenberg 
et al., 1994). TMT suggests that cultural worldviews can be threatened by someone who does not 
ascribe to the particular worldview of the individual being threatened (i.e. an atheist to a 
Christian), often causing hostile or negative evaluations and reactions to the opposing viewpoint 
or group (Schimel et al., 1999). Conversely, we react positively and agree with those who 
support our personal, cultural worldviews, suggesting a powerful in-group/out-group effect of 
mortality salience (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). These people “affirm” the beliefs that we hold 
causing us to bolster and be more confident in them. Because we use culture to imbue ourselves 
  
10 
 
with meaning, a promotion of one’s culture is a promotion of personal self-worth; however, a 
degradation of this this culture leads to a degradation of personal self-worth. 
Interestingly, these results are only found when participants are thinking about their own 
death. Greenberg et al. (1994) found that thinking about the death of a close family member can 
cause worldview defenses to manifest, but not as powerfully as thinking about one’s personal 
death. They argued that this was because the death of another person can serve as a reminder of 
personal vulnerability, but that this differs from person to person. They found that only 
reminders of personal death consistently cause worldview defense manifestation. Thoughts of a 
threatening or anxious situation also do not cause worldview defenses to manifest suggesting that 
it is not the emotional valence associated with death thoughts.. Additionally, Baldwin and 
Wesley (1996) found that thinking about how meaningful life is, is also ineffective at causing 
worldview defense. These results together suggest that only existential concerns associated with 
death awareness are capable of causing worldview defense. 
The cultural defense mechanisms capable of shielding against death anxiety are largely 
based on values that are considered important to the culture where one lives. Arndt, Greenberg, 
and Cook (2002) suggest that nationalistic thoughts are much more accessible following death 
awareness. Other research suggests that we react strongly against those who criticize the culture 
in which we live when under death awareness (e.g. Greenberg et al. 1994; Jonas & Fischer, 
2006). In accordance with TMT, this result would be expected because we should try to defend 
our personal worldviews strongly in the face of death (Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 
1994; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). This finding is not always consistent across gender, however. 
Women do not always show this nationalism increase. Instead, death awareness caused thoughts 
of relationships to be more accessible in women and only occasionally in men. After priming 
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thoughts of America in women, however, they displayed the previously mentioned nationalistic 
cognitions instead of thoughts of relationships following death awareness suggesting that they 
were using nationalism as a worldview defense (Arndt et al., 2002), perhaps because it assisted 
in affirming this worldview This suggests that nationalism and relationships play a role in 
mitigating death anxiety due to their inherent value by the culture, but also that individual 
differences and situational differences may cause different defense mechanisms to manifest.  
A closer examination of relationships, however, reveals that mortality salience has been 
shown to influence sexual interest variously, depending on its interaction with other factors 
(Arndt et al., 2002; Birnbaum, Hirshberger, & Goldenberg, 2010; Goldenberg et al., 2000). 
Mortality salience has been found to decrease interest in casual sex, whereas it has been found to 
increase interest in romantic sex, perhaps because of the greater emotional connection and 
transcendence offered by the context of the romantic relationship (Birnbaum et al., 2010) and the 
importance of belonging (Greenberg et al., 1986) and relationships (Arndt et al., 2002) inherent 
in TMT. Several individual differences influence these findings, however. Although interest in 
romantic sex was consistent across gender and personality variables, interest in casual sex 
generally decreased, but was found to increase in male samples that tended to avoid relationships 
(Birnbaum et al., 2010). This finding is consistent with prior research suggesting that death 
awareness reacts differently with sexual interest due to individual differences such as body self-
esteem and appearance monitoring (Goldenberg et al., 2000).  
The desire for offspring shows similar individual differences in relation to death 
awareness. Baumeister (1991) suggests that children provide a degree of immortality (see also 
Hood and Morris, 1983 for the biosocial mode of death transcendence). Parents can instill the 
beliefs and values important to them in their children. By passing on these values, children 
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provide a symbolic form of immortality capable of decreasing death anxiety (Fritsche et al., 
2006). Wisman and Goldenberg (2005) suggest that men show a strong increase in the desire for 
children after mortality is made salient, but women only show this increase when they are not 
highly motivated by their career. Highly career motivated women show a decrease in desire for 
children. This phenomenon is due to the additional costs associated with raising children that 
only affect women (e.g., carrying the baby, nursing, etc.).  
Although the previous worldview defenses are highly dependent on individual 
differences, other ego defensive mechanisms are much more robust and are resistant to many 
other influences. Religious belief has been observed to greatly mitigate death anxiety regardless 
of many individual differences. Most religions not only provide their followers with rules and 
customs that allow followers to boost their self-esteem by adhering to these values, but unlike 
other defense mechanisms, also provide followers with a literal afterlife (van den Bos et al., 
2012). Research into TMT and religion suggests that confirmation of an afterlife successfully 
shields against death anxiety without evoking personal worldview defenses in which participants 
were given the typical TMT death writings following by a fake scientific article that either 
provided “evidence” of an afterlife or refuted it. They were then given the standard worldview 
defense essays to check for their manifestation. Participants under death awareness who were 
given evidence of an afterlife did not show the typical nationalistic worldview defense 
manifestation, but also did not report negative affect suggesting that death anxiety did not 
manifest. Interestingly, this finding was not contained to religious samples. Self-reported atheists 
were also shielded from death anxiety without evoking traditional worldview defenses 
suggesting that religion can buffer the manifestation of death anxiety. Without having an afterlife 
confirmed, however, both theists and atheists showed the normal worldview defense increase 
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(Heflick & Goldenberg, 2012). Other research suggests that when religious people are able to 
uphold and support their religious beliefs following death awareness, they do not need to bolster 
the traditional worldview defenses to mitigate death anxiety. Their intrinsic religious beliefs are 
effective anxiety buffers (Jonas & Fischer, 2006). This suggests that religious belief mimics the 
general worldview defense outcomes. Additionally, death awareness has been found to increase 
thoughts of supernatural agents (i.e. God) in both theists and atheists and faster responding that 
these agents are real. Jong, Halberstadt, and Bluemke (2012) suggest that death awareness 
caused implicit religious belief in atheists. During this study, participants were made aware of 
their death and given a supernatural agents modified of the Implicit Associates Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Participants (both atheists and theists) in the death 
awareness condition, as opposed to a neutral prime, were faster to respond that the supernatural 
agents presented in the IAT were real suggesting an implicit belief in these agents. Interestingly, 
this finding goes against other TMT research in which death awareness should cause personal 
beliefs to be bolstered as worldview defenses (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Jong et al. (2012) suggest 
that this implies a strong cultural acceptance of Western, religious beliefs which instead suggests 
a careful distinction between implicit belief and ease of activation in which death awareness 
likely caused religious cognition to be more easily available. Despite the difference between 
belief and cultural linking, research into TMT and religion suggests that religion is a powerful 
buffer of death anxiety. 
 
Recent Criticisms 
 Although TMT research has produced many significant findings that have been replicated 
since its origination, many of the integral, theoretical assumptions have recently been challenged. 
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Martin and van den Bos (2014) suggest several problems with the basic assumptions of TMT and 
many of the findings derived from research. Primarily, TMT is not falsifiable. Even null results 
can be interpreted to support TMT. Consider the previous research by Jong et al. (2012) in that 
TMT would have been supported either by atheists’ implicit religious beliefs or by bolstering 
their personal worldviews in order to decrease death anxiety. TMT predicts that atheists can 
either adopt implicit religious belief or embrace their personal atheistic belief because both are 
ego defensive mechanisms. As further evidence of unfalsifiability, Greenberg, Simon, 
Pyszczynski, Solomon, and Chatel (1992) found that that following death awareness, 
conservatives were more likely to react negatively against liberals, but liberals reacted positively 
toward conservatives. These conflicting results can be interpreted as supporting TMT in which 
we should degrade members of an out-group (Rosenblatt et al., 1989) in the case of 
conservatives, but also because an important liberal value is tolerance, liberals are also upholding 
their specific worldview. Martin and van den Bos (2014) suggest that although these 
interpretations may not be wrong, the theory is unable to predict the specific ego defensive 
mechanism in which people will engage. Instead, results are interpreted by the best fitting ego 
defense mechanism.  
 Additionally, Martin and van den Bos (2014) suggest that ambiguous findings can also be 
used to support TMT. Consider Wisman and Goldenberg’s (2005) finding that interest in 
children may increase or decrease depending on several individual differences (e.g., gender, race, 
profession, drive, etc.) and how these differences interact. Martin and van den Bos (2014) argue 
that such qualifications do not add sufficient information that can be used to predict behavior in 
any individual person. Additionally, these qualifications allow for any result to support TMT, 
regardless of the outcome (see previous claim of unfalsifiability). 
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 Although there are several other critical evaluations of TMT posed by Martin and van 
den Bos (2014), the most important critique in regards to the current study is the lack of terror 
reported in lab based death anxiety research. TMT suggests the potential to experience terror 
alleviates any potential anxiety before it successfully manifests without us ever actually 
experiencing terror (Greenberg et al., 2003). Martin and van den Bos (2014) argue that although 
many studies suggest that death awareness does incite some emotional reactions, there has been 
no evidence to show that these emotions are actually terror or the potential to experience it. For 
instance, when asked to talk about their death, several studies have found that participants 
become emotionally upset at these thoughts (J. Jong, personal communication, February 27, 
2015), but this depressed mood and sadness is not directly evidence of terror. Further, most 
studies fail to reveal negative affect following death awareness (see Greenberg et al., 1994 for an 
example). It is from this assertion that the proposed research is drawn. 
 
Current Research 
 In response to the challenge posed by Martin and van den Bos (2014), the current study 
attempts to examine the underlying emotions of death awareness in order to determine if 
potential terror can be examined with physiological measures. Although self-report measures of 
anxiety have failed to indicate the presence of negative emotions (i.e., terror), physiological 
measures of terror may indicate some level of potential terror. For the current study, Galvanic 
Skin Response (GSR) was chosen due to its ability to detect a fear response among fear-evoking 
materials (Kreibig, Wilhelm, Roth, & Gross, 2007). Primarily, the presence of a GSR is due to 
activation of the endocrine sweat glands. This activation is often due to activity within the 
sympathetic nervous system (Uno, 1997). Additionally, activation of the sympathetic nervous 
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system is often due to a fight-or-flight response especially when presented with threatening 
stimuli or situations (Porgas, 2011). As the name suggests, in response to stressful situations (i.e. 
something terrifying), humans either stay and “fight” through the stressful situation or flee 
(“flight”) from it altogether (Cannon, 1932). Thus, from within the context of TMT, although 
participants are not actively experiencing terror but instead defending against this potential 
(Greenberg et al., 2003), the body may naturally begin to prepare for this fight-or-flight response 
in additional to traditional worldview defenses in order to alleviate the “paralyzing terror” 
(Greenberg et al., 1986) caused by mortality salience.   
Within this paradigm, GSR is not novel to TMT; however, the examination of this 
arousal has largely been neglected following the initial research. Rosenblatt et al. (1989) 
examined college students’ bond assessments for a prostitute following mortality salience or a 
neutral control (Study 5). During the testing, however, participants were examined along several 
physiological measures including GSR. The results of this study revealed that GSR did not 
significantly covary with the mortality manipulation to influence bond assessments. Put another 
way, those who were made death aware set the prostitute’s bond significantly higher than those 
in the control condition regardless of GSR. Although this does suggest that GSR does not 
influence worldview defense manifestation (harsher punishment suggests defensive behaviors), 
the study failed to indicate whether or not participants within the mortality salient condition 
reacted physiologically to their death awareness. Additionally, Solomon, Greenberg, and 
Pyszczynski (1991) argue from a TMT perspective, GSR should not increase among those who 
are experiencing higher levels of self-esteem. By boosting participants’ self-esteem via a fake 
feedback task, participants showed lower GSR response to an impending shock. Although this 
has largely been interpreted as though mortality salience should not increase GSR because 
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worldview defenses increase self-esteem, this assertion has not been empirically tested using a 
mortality salience paradigm.  
Given this research and challenges, the current research examined the effects of mortality 
salience on levels of GSR during the introduction of a death prime. Given the duel process model 
of TMT (Pyszcynski et al., 1999), I hypothesized that participants should exhibit a higher GSR 
when they are actively being made aware of their death. This hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that the potential to experience terror should prepare the body for a fight-or-flight 
response (Cannon, 1932), but also because worldview defenses are not manifested and will not 
manifest until several minutes have passed following the completion of the mortality prime 
(Pyszcynski et al., 1999). Additionally, I hypothesize that participants will not self-report any 
change in stress levels due to the mortality prime. Participants will, however, be able to self-
report sadness and distress (J. Jong, personal communication, February 27, 2015). Finally, 
participants in the death aware condition will display more worldview defense in order to combat 
potential anxiety. 
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CHAPTER II. 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Sixty-four participants from a medium, public university in the Southeastern United 
States volunteered to participate in the study. Of this initial number, 3 had to be excluded due to 
exceptionally high GSRs that the sensors were unable to pick-up due to a ceiling on the sensors. 
Thus, 61 participants (female = 44) were included in the study. Previous research suggests that 
mortality salience manipulations are rather robust in finding large effect sizes especially after 
longer delays (Burke, Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Martin & van den Bos, 2014). A power analysis 
revealed that the current study had an 86% chance of finding an effect if the manipulation caused 
a large difference. Additionally, participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 45 with the largest age 
groups being 20 (n = 18) and 21 (n = 16). Participant ethnicity was largely Caucasian (n = 46), 
followed by African American (n = 12), Hispanic/Latino (n = 2), and Other (n = 1). Finally, 
participants were largely Christian (n = 41), followed by No religion (n = 7), Atheist/Agnostic (n 
= 5), Other (n = 4), Hindu (n = 1), Muslim (n = 1), Jewish (n = 1), and Pagan (n = 1). 
 
Materials and Procedure 
  Prior to any recruitment or testing, Institutional Review Board approval was obtained 
from the UTC human subjects committee. Upon reporting to the lab, participants read an 
informed consent telling them that they will be completing questionnaires about basic personality 
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variables and how they interact with thoughts of an unpleasant situation and arousal. This cover 
story was crafted in order to keep participants from prematurely considering their own mortality 
and to keep the control group uncontaminated. Once informed consent was attained, participants 
completed basic demographics (e.g. age, ethnicity, etc.). Prior to any prime, participants 
completed the pretest version of the Short State Stress Questionnaire (SSSQ; Helton & Naswall, 
2014) in order to control for pre-existing differences in stress (“I’m reflecting about myself”). 
The scale is composed of 3 subscales (Distress, α = .854; Engagement, α = .783; and Worry, α = 
.820) and scores were calculated by averaging the response to each of the 24 items among each 
subscale. Following the SSSQ pretest, two electrodes were placed on the index and ring finger of 
each participant in order to obtain GSR levels. Participants were instructed to wipe their hands if 
they were perceived as wet by the experimenters prior to connection or if the sensors were 
unable to attain a reading. The responses were collected by a Neulog GSR Logger Sensor NUL-
217. Each sensor was calibrated to sample at a rate of 10 samples per second. Participants were 
instructed to place their hand on the desk in front of them and not move while the sensor was 
connected. Participants were then randomly assigned to either the experimental or control 
condition. During this assignment, experimenters instructed participants to stare at a fixation 
point on a screen directly in front of them. A baseline GSR was taken for each participant at this 
time. 
In the experimental condition, participants had death awareness manipulated using the 
standard death manipulation. This procedure asked participants to answer two open-ended 
questions (“Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in 
you” and “Tell me, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you physically as 
you die and once you are physically dead;” Greenberg et al., 1994, p 628). These questions are 
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traditionally used in TMT research in order to manipulate death awareness (Greenberg et al., 
1994). In the control condition, participants were asked to respond to two open-ended questions 
about watching TV (“Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of watching TV 
arouses in you” and “Tell me, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you 
physically as you watch TV;” Greenberg et al., 1994, p 628).  Participants responded to these 
questions orally due to the GRS equipment on their hand. Additionally, the experimenters probed 
participants for longer responses if their response was less than one minute. 
Following the final question in each condition, participants completed the posttest version 
of the SSSQ (Helton & Naswall, 2014) in order to examine self-reported stress immediately 
following the primes (“I felt self-conscious”). Participants were instructed to answer each 
question relating back to how they felt during the talking task. Scores were calculated by 
averaging the 24 items together among each subscale (Distress, α = .848; Engagement, α = .792; 
and Worry, α = .875). Participants then completed the Positive Affect, Negative Affect Schedule 
– Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson et al., 1988) to assess self-reported negative affect (i.e. 
Afraid) and to serve as a delay in order for worldview defenses to manifest. Items on the 
negative affect subscale were calculated by averaging the 10 items (α = .892). Additionally, the 
PANAS-X has several subscales of which Negative Affect Fear (α = .893) and Negative Affect 
Sadness (α = .851) hold significance within the current study. The other subscales (i.e. positive 
affect) were simply used as a delay. Finally, participants read two essays that they were told were 
written by immigrants to the United States. One essay is overtly positive toward the United 
States and the other is highly critical (Greenberg et al., 1994). Participants were asked to evaluate 
each essay and the authors via overall credibility, agreement, and liking of both the essays and 
the authors (positive essay α = .878; negative essay α = .895). These essays are often used in 
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TMT research and examine the manifestation of worldview defenses. Participants were then 
thanked, debriefed, and allowed to ask questions.  
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CHAPTER III. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
Preliminary Analyses  
 
In order to prepare the data for analysis, pretest scores were subtracted from posttest 
scores in order to create change variables. These change variables controlled for individual 
differences within the GSR and stress. Prior to any group comparisons, each dependent variable 
was examined so that it meets statistical assumptions. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that 
the GSR change scores were both positively skewed and kurtotic, p = .003. A base 1 was added 
to each score and a log10 transformation was conducted to correct for non-normality. Following 
the transformation, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the transformed GSR change 
scores met the assumption of normality, p > .200. Additional Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
revealed that both the positive essay (p > .200) and the negative essay (p > .200) met the 
assumption of normality. The negative essay scores were then subtracted from the positive essay 
scores in order to create an overall measure of worldview defense. This transformation is 
consistent with previous research (Greenberg et al., 1994). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed 
that the overall measure of worldview defense met the assumption of normality as well, p > .200. 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were also conducted on the pretest/posttest change on the 3 SSSQ 
subscales and revealed that Engagement (p > .200) and Worry (p > .200) met the assumption of 
normality; however, Distress was negatively skewed and positively kurtotic, p < .001. A base 3 
was added to each score and a log10 transformation was conducted, but failed to correct for non-
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normality, p < .001. Additionally, a square root was taken for each score, but still failed to 
correct for non-normality, p < .001. Thus, nonparametric analyses were conducted for Distress. 
Finally, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were conducted for the PANAS-X subscales for Fear (p < 
.001) and Sadness (p < .001) revealing that the data was significantly skewed and kurtotic. A 
log10 transformation was conducted, but failed to correct for non-normality in both scales, p < 
.001. Additionally, a square root was taken for each scale but still failed to correct for non-
normality, p < .001. Nonparametric analyses were also conducted for Fear and Sadness. 
 
Hypothesis Testing  
In order to test the initial hypothesis that GSR will be higher among participants who are 
primed to think about their death, a paired samples t-test was conducted for those participants in 
the death aware condition to compare baseline GSR with GSR during the mortality salience. The 
results of this analysis revealed a significant difference between baseline GSR (M = 2.187, SD = 
1.481) and GSR during the prime (M = 2.594, SD = 1.592), t(30) = -6.602, p < .001). This result 
suggests that death awareness may cause increased arousal. A paired samples t-test also revealed 
a significant difference in the control condition between baseline GSR (M = 2.113, SD = .934) 
and GSR while talking about TV watching (M = 2.590, SD = 1.161), t(28) = -4.690, p < .001. 
This result suggests that the previously mentioned effect may have been influenced by talking 
and cognition. In order to determine that this effect was due to the death awareness and not 
simply due to talking and cognition, an independent samples t-test was conducted on the GSR 
change scores. A Levene’s test revealed that equal variances could be assumed between groups, 
F = .140, p = .710. The results of the t-test failed to find a significant difference in GSR change 
between the death aware group (M = .408, SD = .344) and the control group (M = .478, SD = 
  
24 
 
.548), t(58) = .387, p = .700. Research by Hirschberger, Ein-Dor, Caspi, Arzouan, and 
Zivotofsky (2010) and Strachan et al. (2007), however, suggests that those who are biased 
toward negative information (i.e. those high in negative affect) should react more strongly to 
mortality salience. An additional ANCOVA was conducted on GSR change scores while 
controlling for negative affect. A Levene’s test revealed that equal variances could be assumed 
between groups, F = .132, p = .717. The results of the ANCOVA failed to find a significant main 
effect for condition even when controlling for negative affect, F(1, 56) = .043, p = .837. Results 
also failed to indicate a significant main effect for negative affect, F(1, 56) = .003, p = .956). 
Lastly, results failed to indicate a significant interaction between condition and negative affect, 
F(1, 56) = .149, p = .701. These results together suggest that among this sample, death awareness 
does not significantly influence GSR. 
 In order to test whether or not mortality salience influences state levels of stress, three 
separate independent samples t-tests were conducted on the change scores for the SSSQ 
subscales Engagement and Worry. A Levene’s test revealed that equal variance could be 
assumed between groups for the Engagement subscale, F = .172, p = .680. Results failed to 
indicate a significant difference in Engagement between the death aware (M = -.371, SD = .666) 
and the control group (M = -.513, SD = .719), t(58) = -.794, p = .430. Further, a Levene’s test 
revealed that equal variance could be assumed between groups for the Worry subscale, F = .747, 
p = .391. Results failed to indicate a significant difference in Worry between the death aware (M 
= .323, SD = .913) and the control group (M = .410, SD = .806), t(58) = .390, p = .698. A Mann 
Whitney test was conducted on the SSSQ Distress subscale due to significant non-normality. The 
results of this analysis revealed a significant difference between the death aware (Mean Rank = 
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34.81) and the control condition (Mean Rank = 25.90) in which those in the death aware 
condition reported significantly more distress following the prime, U = 316.000, p = .046. 
 An additional independent samples t-test was conducted to examine the effects of 
mortality salience on worldview defense manifestation measure by the combined scores on the 
positive and negative essay evaluations. A Levene’s test revealed that equal variance could be 
assumed between groups, F = 1.835, p = .181. Surprisingly, the results failed to indicate a 
difference in worldview defense between the death aware (M = 1.39, SD = 2.58) and the control 
condition (M = .51, SD = 1.99), t(58) = -1.475, p = .146. An ANCOVA was then conducted to 
control for negative affect. A Levene’s test revealed that equal variance could be assumed 
between groups, F = 1.712, .196. These results failed to indicate a significant main effect for 
condition when controlling for negative affect, F(1, 56) = .469, p = .496. Negative affect also 
failed to significantly influence worldview defense, F(1, 56) = .003, p = .954. Finally, the results 
failed to indicate a significant interaction between condition and negative affect, F(1, 56) = .015, 
p = .904. Overall these results suggest that among this sample, mortality salience failed to 
significantly increase worldview defense. 
 Two further analyses were conducted on the PANAS-X subscales Fear and Sadness. Due 
to non-normality, a Mann-Whitney test was conducted to compare groups among levels of fear 
and sadness. The results of the analyses failed to find a significant difference in Fear between the 
death aware (Mean Rank = 33.39) and control group (Mean Rank = 27.41), p = .182. The results 
did, however, indicate a difference in Sadness between the death aware (Mean Rank = 35.31) and 
control group (Mean Rank = 25.36), U = 300.500, p = .022. These results suggest that talking 
about death caused participants to experience significantly more sadness than those talking about 
watching TV.  
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 Finally, in order to examine multiple aspects of the terror, a Structural Equation Model 
(SEM) was computed allowing “terror” to be a latent variable as represented by GSR change, 
Negative Affect, Sadness (as scored on the PANAS-X), Fear (as scored on the PANAS-X), and 
the SSSQ subscales (Worry, Distress, Engagement). Condition was dummy coded (control = 0, 
death = 1) for this model. Additionally, covariances were assigned as 1 in the unstandardized 
model so as to control for underidentification. The results of the analysis can be found in Figure 
1. This model suggests that death awareness caused a significant increase in “Terror,” β = .603, p 
< .001. Further analyses, however, revealed that the overall model suffered from poor goodness-
of-fit, RMSEA = .185, suggesting that the model may be misrepresentative. Thus, considering the 
aforementioned results that death awareness did not significantly influence GSR change, Fear, 
Worry, or Engagement, the model suggests that better representations of terror may be needed. 
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Figure 1   Structural Equation Model of Terror as a Function of Death Awareness 
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CHAPTER IV. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
 The primary purpose of the current study was to examine the potential to experience 
terror following death awareness. The results are somewhat conflicting in which evidence of 
terror was found in certain analyses. The initial analyses revealed that physiological arousal did 
not differ between the death aware and control conditions. Subsequent analyses revealed that 
death awareness did not cause Fear, Worry, or Engagement to manifest. Contradictory to 
previous research (i.e. Greenberg et al., 1994), even worldview defenses did not manifest 
following mortality salience. On the other hand, Distress and Sadness (which arguably should be 
an aspect of Terror) did increase following death awareness. Several interpretations and 
conclusions are drawn from these results.  
 Primarily, although worldview defenses were not observed following death awareness, 
participants were still likely boosting their self-esteem via other defense mechanisms. For 
instance, Jonas & Fischer (2006) found that those who are intrinsically religious can utilize their 
religious beliefs as a shield without causing worldview defenses to manifest. Additionally, Vail 
et al. (2010), suggest that religious fundamentalist beliefs are often bolstered following death 
awareness. Considering that the research was conducted on a sample from the Bible Belt, 
participants were likely utilizing religious belief in order to boost self-esteem. Consistent with 
Solomon et al. (1990), when self-esteem was increased (which according to TMT death 
awareness should have caused, Greenberg et al., 1986), participants did not respond with 
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increased arousal. Thus, although not a primary goal of the current study, results did provide 
support for Solomon et al. (1990) by providing empirical support for the lack of arousal 
following death awareness. This assertion requires further empirical support using various 
measures of worldview defense and self-esteem following death awareness and measures of 
physiological arousal.  
 Additionally, the lack of findings within the Worry, Engagement, and Fear measures is 
largely consistent with previous TMT research and supports the hypothesis that participants will 
be unable to consciously experience any stress or terror following mortality salience. 
Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Koole, and Solomon (2010) argue that death awareness does not cause 
any increase in negative affective mood states. Additionally, the duel-process model of TMT 
(Pyszczynski et al., 1999) suggest that we actively try to repress death awareness which would 
explain the lack of self-report evidence. Interestingly and contradictory to this finding, 
participants did, however report more sadness and distress following the mortality salience. This 
secondary finding is consistent with other research that had participants talk about their death 
instead of write about it (J. Jong, personal communication, February, 15, 2015). This 
contradiction could be due to a theoretical distinction between terror and sadness. Although 
sadness may accompany certain aspects of terror, certainly terror is far more complex than 
sadness alone.  
This distinction is largely important for interpreting each finding from the current 
research and primarily the reason for the additional SEM. Certainly, terror is far more than 
arousal, fear, worry, stress, negative affectivity, or sadness by themselves. Additionally, the SEM 
suggests that terror is far more than these variables together as well. This may explain the lack of 
findings. If TMT is correct and the potential to experience terror is at the heart of everything 
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humans do (Greenberg et al., 1986; Greenberg et al., 2003), this potential should be accompanied 
by some form of physiological or biological mechanisms to prepare for this terror should it 
actually manifest. The fight-or-flight model (Cannon, 1932) at least suggests that this should 
occur. Certainly, this interpretation is evolutionarily adaptive. Although worldview defenses are 
largely capable of keeping this potential terror from manifesting, the fight-or-flight response 
should be activated to prepare for this terror. Thus, although the current study failed to find this 
response, this is possibly due to the complexity of terror and the unaccounted for factors that 
contribute to terror. 
Within GSR, however, previous research suggests that this should have indicated 
sympathetic nervous system activity (Uno, 1997) and ultimately a fight-or-flight response 
(Porgas, 2011). Although this could be interpreted as a lack of terror following mortality 
salience, several confounds were also present within the study that may have impacted the GSR 
results. Initially, the lack of difference may have been due to the control prime. Watching TV has 
been found to cause significant arousal as recording by GSR (see Lajante, Droulers, Dondaine, & 
Amarantini, 2012). Participants were likely aroused by their thoughts about watching TV and the 
results support this interpretation. Further, this manipulation may have unintentionally, been 
more realistic than the death aware condition because participants were staring at a fixation cross 
on a screen. This effect would have been similar to having participants stare at a coffin or 
tombstone with their names on it while talking about their death. Thus, perhaps the control 
condition was far more real than the death aware condition causing the death aware condition to 
appear to lack an effect. Ultimately, participants in each condition may have been aroused by 
their memory and imagination of watching TV in the control condition and potential terror in the 
  
31 
 
death aware condition. Additional research is needed to further verify this claim in order to be 
certain that normal cognition and talking do not cause a GSR above death awareness.  
The current study also failed to find any evidence for worldview defenses following 
mortality salience. Although in the death aware condition average worldview defenses were 
higher, this difference was not significant. A further examination of the results revealed a 
surprising lack of power to detect a significant effect (power = .306) given previous research in 
TMT. This is in direct contrast to previous research suggesting that TMT reveals large effects 
within worldview defenses (Burke et al., 2013). As previously mentioned, however, participants 
were likely relying on religious belief as a defense against the mortality salience. This may 
explain why the worldview defenses (as measured using cultural worldviews, Greenberg et al., 
1994) did not significantly differ between groups. Considering that participants in the sample 
were largely religious, they may have instead relied on their religion as a shield instead of using 
cultural worldviews (see Vail et al., 2010). Future research using religious samples should 
instead focus on religious worldviews (i.e. religious fundamentalism) when assessing worldview 
defense. 
Although cultural worldview defenses were not found in the present study, TMT predicts 
that other defenses were operating and necessary to contend with the potential to experience 
terror (Greenberg et al., 1986; Greenberg et al., 2003). With this in mind, an alternative 
explanation to the lack of terror found in the study may be due to these defenses and active 
repression. While participants were actively contending with death awareness, this active 
repression may have successfully kept participants from becoming aroused and terrified (see 
Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Once repression failed, however, worldview defenses would have then 
begun to keep the potential terror from manifesting (Greenberg et al. 1994). Although the fight-
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or-flight model would predict that the sympathetic nervous system would begin to prepare the 
body for this potential terror (Cannon, 1932) should it manifest, perhaps instead, worldview 
defenses are far more powerful in maintaining and controlling terror than expected. Thus, 
through evolutionary adaptation (see TMT’s evolutionary account of culture creation in 
introduction), worldview defenses may have supplanted fight-or-flight in response to death 
awareness due to their power. Although this argument is less likely, it is still consistent with 
TMT overall. 
One final interpretation offered warrants modification to TMT. Although TMT predicts 
that we have the potential to experience paralyzing terror following mortality salience 
(Greenberg et al., 2003), the current results do question that claim. According to Hood and 
Morris (1983), unlike the denial perspectives of TMT which argue that we achieve immortality 
by denying death, we can achieve immortality through a transcendent union. This interpretation 
would suggest that that symbolic immortality does not manifest due to a fear of death, but 
instead due to a mystical experience (i.e. mysticism, see Hood, 1976) caused by the union with 
others, nature, deities, etc. Given this research, perhaps TMT is in need of a fourth modification 
(actual terror to repressed terror to potential terror) in which persons can transcend death through 
mystical experience. This would still account for the cultural worldviews and symbolic 
immortality so often defended in TMT research. Instead of potential terror causing worldviews, 
it is cultural union that bolsters worldviews. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Although the current study did hold some explanatory power and remained largely 
consistent with previous TMT research, several limitations are offered. Initially, even the SEM 
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model failed to take into account all facets of terror, perhaps explaining much of the lack of 
findings. Additionally, the monitor used as a fixation point and TV control likely also influenced 
the results considerably (see previous section for more discussion on this confound). When 
considering GSR, the research would have benefited from including an extended relaxation 
period prior to the baseline. Although participants did have several minutes in between beginning 
the experiment and the GSR measurement, more control could have been implemented to assure 
resting GSR at the baseline measurement. Within this, participants may have also been nervous 
when the GSR equipment was first connected. This would have caused elevated arousal that 
likely contaminated the GSR readings. A longer rest period with the GSR equipment would have 
allowed participants to become accustomed to the equipment and provided purer arousal 
readings. Alternative worldview defense measures would have also benefited the current study. 
Although all of the previous research in TMT provides evidence for defense (e.g. Greenberg et 
al. 1994, Pyszczynski et al. 1999; Greenberg et al., 2003), failing to show evidence of defenses, 
but speculating for alternative defenses based on demographic information does yield some 
concern. 
 One additional concern, however, is that although the primary goal of the study was to 
address the challenges of TMT by Martin and van den Bos (2014) for evidence of terror, the 
current interpretations of the results fail to account for their claim that TMT is unfalsifiable. Each 
likely interpretation could fit within a TMT framework. This limitation strongly suggests the 
need for future follow-up so that specific mechanisms for terror can be examined either showing 
that the body is preparing for sympathetic nervous system activity or that worldview defenses are 
solely alleviating potential terror.  
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 In addition to improving upon the aforementioned limitations, future research should 
consider looking at additional indicators of terror. For instance, salivary cortisol may prove 
fruitful in finding evidence of the body preparing for fight-or-flight in response to potential 
terror. Additionally, participants may also physically display a fight-or-flight response following 
death awareness by “fleeing” from the location of the mortality salience. On the other hand, 
participants made death aware may also choose to stay and “fight” through a difficult follow-up 
task immediately following the mortality salience.  
Overall, this research contributes to the TMT literature by re-opening the door (Solomon 
et al. 1991) to physiological and biological markers in response to the potential to experience 
terror and suggests that additional research is needed. Future research should help to narrow 
down the multiple predictions offered for the current study and perhaps address Martin and van 
den Bos’s (2014) claim that TMT does not evoke terror and that TMT is unfalsifiable. 
Ultimately, this research does provide some evidence for some aspects of the complexities of 
terror (e.g. sadness, distress, etc.) and argues for the importance of examining multiple facets of 
terror in order to accurately account for this potential. By examining the complexities of terror, 
we can better understand the theoretical assumptions inherent to TMT and obtain more 
explanatory power in light of criticism and controversy within the field. 
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